Inflation, unemployment, and money: comparing the evidence from two simple models by Keith M. Carlson
IWO years ago, Professors Barru and Fischer intro-
duced their survey of monetary theory with the fol-
lowing statement:
Perhaps the most striking contrast between current
views of money and those of thirty years ago is the
rediscovery of the endogeneity of the price level and
inflation and their relation to the behavior of money.1
This assessment contrasts sharply with that of the
Council of Economic Advisers in their 1978 Annual
Report.2 In a forty-one page chapter on inflation and
unemployment, there are only two oblique references
to monetary policy as a contributing factor to the
inflationary process.
The theory of inflation that underlies the Council’s
discussion is conventional — inflation is usually initi-
ated by excess demand, but once the momentum builds
up, “the rate of wage and price increase reacts very
slowly to idle resources and excess supply.”3 The
Council believes there is a trade-off between inflation
and unemployment, but rejects the terms of the
trade-off as too costly. They argue that
it would take at least 6 years of the current de-
gree of economic slack (an unemployment rate near
6½percent) to cut the inflation rate from 6 to 3
percent.4
Consequently, the Council’s recommended strategy for
inflation control is one of “voluntarism”, jawboning,
and structural improvements. Implicit in this strategy
is a stabilization policy stimulative enough to propel
the economy to high employment and full utilization
of capacity.5
The Council’s strategy for economic policy rests on
a belief in the inflation-unemployment trade-off and a
neglect of money. In particular, the apparent current
policy strategy is reminiscent of that applied in Au-
gust 1971 svhen the price-wage freeze was introduced.
At that time the same thinking prevailed — hold
prices down directly and reduce unemployment via
expansionary monetary and fiscal policy.6
1
Robert J. Barro and Stanley Fischer, “Recent Developments
in Monetary Theory,” Journal of Monetary Economics (April
1976), p. 133,
2




lbid., pp. 73-75, 152-56.
6Economic Report of the President, 1972, pp. 22-27.
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The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that
the apparent trade-off between inflation and unem-
ployment is in fact the result of variable monetary
growth. The approach draws heavily on recent work
by Professor Stein of Brown University.7 The appear-
ance of a trade-off results from differences in the tim-
ing of the response of inflation and unemployment to
changes in monetary growth. However, the trade-off is
an illusion. Unemployment responds to monetary
growth in the short run, but tends towards a steady-
state value in the long run. Effects Qfmppeta rowth
on inflation aiTj3~st the opposite; there is little effect
~
~ These processes have implica-
tions that are strongly at variance with those advo-
cated by the Council of Economic Advisers.
The Relation Between Inflation and
Une;nplorpnent: The Conventional
‘View’ and Modifications
The relation between inflation and unemployment
is usually depicted by the Phillips curve.8 According to
this relationship, high rates of inflation are associated
with low rates of unemployment; likewise, low infla-
tion rates are associated with high unemployment
rates. Within recent years, however, experience in the
United States and other countries has run counter to
the prediction of the original relation. In particular,
there have been times that inflation and unemploy-
ment have moved in the same direction, a phenom-
enon that has been labeled “stagflation.” Economists
have reacted to this experience by augmenting Phil-
lips curve theory with consideration of the effects of
inflationary expectations.”
Lately, the Phillips curve discussion has taken yet
another twist. Some economists have suggested that
accelerations and decelerations of inflation are related
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iJerome L. Stein, “Inflation and Stagflation,” forthcoming in
~t Journal of Banking and Finance, and ‘Inflation, Employment and Stagflation,” Journal of Monetary Economics (April 1978), pp. 193-228.
8
The original analysis is found in A. W. Phillips, “The Relation
Between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money
Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 1861-1957,” Econornica
(November 1958), pp. 283-99.
9
For a survey of the Phillips curve literature, see Robert J.
Gordon, “Recent Developments in the Theory of Inflation and
Unemployment,” Journal of Monetary Economics (April
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to the level of unemployment. For example, according
to Modigliani and Papademos,
historical experience clearly supports the propo-
sition that there exists some critical rate of unemploy-
ment such that, as long as unemployment does not fall
below it, inflation can be expected to decline. . 10
They go on to refer to this critical unemployment rate
as the noninflationary rate of unemployment (NIRU).
In this case, “noninflationary” is defined to mean that
the rate of inflation, at whatever level, is not
increasing.
The value of NIRU can be derived from an esti-
mate of the following simple relation:~’
Pt — pt-i = Cro + Cr1
Ut-j
The symbol pi sthe year-to-year percent change in
the GNP deflator and Ui sthe unemployment rate.
Using annual data from 1952 to 1976, this equation
is estimated as
(1) pt—pt-i = 2.463 — .453 Ut-i 112 = .15
(1.970) (-1.894) SE = 1.41
DW = 1.79
Since the dependent variable is a second difference,
there is considerable variation in it. The unemploy-
ment rate explains only a small portion of this varia-
tion, although both the coefficients in the equation
are significant at the ten percent level (t statistics are
shown in parentheses).
Since NIRU is defined as that rate of unemployment
which is consistent with nonaccelerating inflation, its
value can be found by setting Pt — nt-i = 0 in equa-
tion (1) and solving for U. The value of NIRU for
this estimated equation is 5.44 percent.
This estimate of equation (1) is consistent with the
Council of Economic Advisers’ assessment of the
terms of the inflation-unemployment trade-off in theft
1978 Annual Report. A 6.5 percent unemployment
rate was used as an example of sufficient slack in the
economy such that a deceleration of inflation of 0.5
percent per year would be generated. Substituting
6.5 into equation (1) yields a decline in p of 0.48
percentage points per year.
By way of comment, it should be noted that this
model does not indicate how a particular rate of
inflation or rate of unemployment is attained. Rather,
the equation simply shows how inflation will change,
t0
Franco Modigliani and Lucas Papademos, “Monetary Policy
for the Coming Quarters The Conflicting Views,” New
England Economic Review (March/April 1976), p. 4.
11The Modigliani-Papademos approach to estimating NIRU is
much more convoluted. For a critique of the Modigliani-
Papademos results, see Stein, ‘In&tion, Employment and
Stagilation.”
given the degree of slack in the economy as measured
by the unemployment rate. To complete the model,
an equation specifying the determination of the un-
employment rate would have to be added. In this way
the effect of monetary and fiscal policy could be cap-
hired via the effect on the unemployment rate.
The .Relation Between In.fiatic’n and
LTnemploysn.ent: A Monetary View
An alternate view of the relation between inflation
and unemployment is that both variables are respond-
ing to the movements of a third variable. To the ex-
tent that there appears to be a relationship between
movements in prices and unemployment, it is in fact
a reflection of differential time responses to changes in
the third variable. This is the monetary view, which
stresses the long-run relation between money and
prices, but also takes into account transitory effects of
money on real product growth and unemployment.
According to the monetary view, shifts in the short-
run Phillips curve are associated with changes in the
growth rate of money. The hypothesis is that the
fundamental determinant of the inflation rate is the
rate of monetary expansion. Regardless of the initial
conditions, the inflation rate will tend to converge to
the rate of monetary growth, and the unemployment
rate will tend toward its steady state value, This
steady state value is not, however, related to the
NIRU concept mentioned above. In fact, the mone-
tary interpretation denies the validity of the NIRU
argument.
In an attempt to keep the analysis simple, another
single equation is specified as representative of the
monetary view. Like Equation (1), the focus is on
accelerations and decelerations of inflation. Accord-
ing to the monetary view, inflation will accelerate if
money growth exceeds the ongoing inflation rate for
an extended period of time (approximately one year).
This simple representation of the monetary view ap-
pears as follows:
Pt— Pt-i = ~o+ {3i(mt-i — pt-i)
Symbols are as defined above, with the addition of
in, the year-to-year percent change in the narrowly
defined money stock (Ml).
Estimating this equation for the period 1954 to
1976, using annual data, yields the following:’2
(2) Pt—pt-i = .449 (mt_i — pt_i)
(4.106)
i2
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These results indicate that inflation will accelerate
by 0.45 of a percentage point in each year following
that in which money growth exceeds the inflation rate
by one percentage point. Based on the specification
of this equation, inflation will not accelerate or decel-
erate if the money growth rate equals the inflation
rate. Comparing the monetary equation with the con-
ventional equation indicates that the monetary equa-
tion explains a larger proportion of the variation in
— pt-i, and the standard error of the equation is
reduced by 20 percent.
Suppose now that both views have merit. Can the
rate of monetary expansion and the unemployment
rate be used to explain accelerations and decelera-
tions of inflation? To investigate this possibility, the
following version was estimated:
Pt — pt-i = ~o + yl (Ut-, — UE) + y2(mt-i — pt_i)
The value of the critical unemployment rate, as calcu-
lated from Equation (1), was inserted into the equa-
tion as U5. Again, using annual data from 1952
through 1976, the following results were obtained:
(3) pt — pt-i = .001 — .177 (Ut-i — 5.44)
(.004) (—.826)
+ .406 (mt_i — pt-i)
(3.301)
For this specification of the equation, supposedly
allowing for both conventional and monetary effects,
neither the unemployment rate nor the constant are
significant. However, the monetary variable remains
significant, although the value of the coefficient is
slightly less than in (2). The R2 and standard error
are only slightly changed from (2).
The implication of these results is that accelerations
and decelerations of inflation are not systematically
related to the degree of resource utilization as meas-
ured by the unemployment rate. Restricting the analy-
sis to very simple models, changes in the rate of infla-
tion are much more closely associated with monetary
growth, with no independent effect coming from the
unemployment rate.
What does the monetary view say about the deter-
mination of the unemployment rate? The monetary
view recognizes short-run impacts of money on out-
put and employment. This relationship can be speci-
fied as:
Ut — Ut_i = on + b~U~.i +
8
2(mt_i — pt_i)
This equation is sitnply a distributed lag response
of the unemployment rate, U, to monetary growth.
There is a transitory effect of money on unemploy-
ment when monetary growth is greater or less than
the inflation rate. Over the long run, however, steady
monetary growth has no effect on unemployment be-
cause, according to equation (2), monetary growth
and inflation are the same in equilibrium. As a result,
the m,_~— Pt-i term goes to zero and the equilibrium
unemployment rate is determined by 3~and 3,.
The estimated unemployment equation for the
period 1954-76 is as follows:
(4) U~ — Uti = 3.958 — .721 Uti
(5.079) (—4.862)
— .380 (mt_i — pti)
(—4.486)
The implied steady state value for the unemployment
rate, found by setting U, = U,_,, is 5.49 (that is,
3.958 ± .721), essentially the same result asin equation
(1). The interpretation of this equation is that money
growth in excess of the inflation rate has a temporary
effect on unemployment, but this effect disappears as
the inflation rate converges to the growth rate of
money in the long run. The steady state unemploy-
ment rate for the monetary view differs from NIRU
in that inflation can accelerate even if the unemploy-
ment rate is in excess of its critical value.
Policy rawlications
The policy implications of these two views of the
relation between inflation and unemployment differ
substantially. The concept of NIRU suggests that pol-
icymakers need not consider inflation a problem until
unemployment approaches this critical value. On the
other hand, the monetary view stresses the effect of
excessive monetary growth on inflation, independent
of the prevailing unemployment rate. The lesson of
the monetary view is that, in the long run, a steady
growth of money will eventually result in a rate of
inflation equal to that of monetary growth, and a
rate of unemployment that will go to its steady state
value. Only by constantly accelerating monetary
growth is it possible to use monetary actions to re-
duce unemployment.
Consider the two views in terms of conditions as
they exist in 1978. The inflation rate for 1977 over
1976 was 5.9 percent, and the unemployment rate in
1977 averaged 7 percent. The conventional view ar-
gues that inflation will not accelerate as long as unem-
ployment stays above 5.44 percent. Consequently, it
appears that output can be stimulated until the critical
unemployment rate is reached. Then the stimulus can
be reduced to a rate commensurate with long-term
growth. The monetary view, on the other hand, indi-
cates that money growth in excess of the ongoing in-
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Table I
HYPOTHETICAL CASE A, CONVENTIONAL VIEW
Attempted Gradual Return to Full Employment
(1) Pt — Pt—i = 2.463 --—.453 Ut_i
(2) Ut — Ut_i = — .412 (At—3.5)
ft !.
1977 (Act.) 4.9% 7.0% 5.9% 11 .o% 7.2%
1978 4.7 6.5 5.2 10.1 6.6
1979 4.7 6.0 4.7 9.6 6.1
1980 4.7 5.5 4.5 9.4 5.9
1981 3.7 5.4 4.4 8.2 4.7
1982 3.5 5.4 4.4 8.0 4.5
1983 3.5 5.4 4.4 8.0 4.5
1984 3.5 5.4 4.4 8.0 4.5
1985 3.5 5.4 4.4 8.0 4.5
Note: A path t’,,r U v.as selecirti and then the path of p wa~eaku-
ated using t,i:ItC,., r. I] ‘ . The 12 p~tb a as used to do’ lye tht
nit.lk’d tilti, _h rate ,.f .‘utj~ut1 , asstrniiri,r iiutt’’itiuI
otitint 9 -ow, itt :1.~ j.t’t-ecnt per year. The x Sri ‘, :‘at
ti’, il-en i.e. I t., derive y the yrnt.th ,,dvof r,unth,aI
GNPI . soil then ac.-,’.rnrig v’.Iocity ~n,Wth of 3.5 rerceot
per yea’, the path.’’ cnn as dr.:~,4.
even if the unemployment rate is above its critical
value.
Two different policy paths for the conventional
model are shown in Tables I and II. Table I sum-
marizes a policy directed toward a gradual return to
full employment (NIRU) by 1980, and Table II shows
an attempt to reach full employment quickly — in
1978. These cases were constructed by selecting a
target path for unemployment and then calculating
the effect of unemployment on inflation using Equa-
tion (1). An Okun’s Law’3 equation (See equation
(2), Table I) was added to the model to find the
growth of output consistent with the unemployment
path. By adding together the rates of increase in
output and the price level the implied growth of
nominal GNP was calculated as a step towards de-
riving the growth rate of money consistent with the
path of the other variables.’4
According to Table I, based on a gradual return to
full employment, inflation and unemployment decline
simultaneously until 1980, and then stabilize. By add-
ing an assumption of constant velocity growth of 3.5
percent to the conventional model, steady state rates
iiArthur M. Oknn, “Potential GNP: Its Measurement and Sig-
nThcance,” The Political Economy of Prosperity (Washington,
D.C.: The Brookiogs Institution, 1970), pp. 132-45.
~This is based on the following:
m+v = p+x
where m: rate of increase in money
v: rate of increase in velocity
p: rate of increase inthe price level
x: rate of increase in output.
Table II
HYPOTHETICAL CASE B, CONVENTIONAL VIEW
Attempted Rapid Return to Full Employment
tI) Pt — pt—i = 2.463 — .453 Ut_i
~j Ut — Ut—i = — .412(xt 3.5)
2!.
1977 (Act.) 4.9% 7.0% 5.9% Ii .o% 7.2%
1978 7.4 5.4 5.2 13.0 9.5
1979 3.5 5.4 5.2 8.9 5.4
1980 3.5 5.4 5.2 8.9 5.4
1981 3.5 5.4 5.2 8.9 5.4
1982 3.5 5,4 5.2 8.9 5.4
1983 3.5 5.4 5.2 8.9 5.4
1984 3.5 5.4 5.2 8.9 5.4
1985 3.5 5.4 5.2 8,9 5.4
Note See Table I.
(II hlU)lIrteil—v’4r0\\ th and inllatioi areaho derived.
l}icsc sI ead~state rates-appear lit lie diirerelit titan
tl use for the iip melan’ amcici. IIo~vever I he path to
(his equilibrium differs substanbally.
\ecording to -I’altIe II, also 1iascd on the concept
of NIll . there ‘tj ~~ [N t C I I~e 110 ti hstadet oretunung
to Lull euiphn went quiekl> . ‘flit’ clifkrencc between
the resuLts iii ‘I alit’s I and LI is that a quick retuni
to full eutpluvnieiit lock’’’ the model in at a higher
gruu tl~rate of utility -and inflation thall clues the
t.~t’adti~i1 ap~irtuac’lt. Iii, t’v.isuiit for tIns disparity of
i’t’suiit.s f~jj’ [lie eoln-i’ntioljal niudel is that the at_
teili]ll t’cI. (jllH’k l’t’tLIni to full emplo~ went allows tiic’
c-fleet oF wiemplovnit’ut ui inflation to operate for
only otie ) e.tr.
Table Ill
HYPOTHETICAL CASE A: MONETARY VIEW
Attempted Gradual Return to Full Employment
P1 Pt Pt-i = .449 (mt_I -—pt..il
(2) Ut — UN] 3.958 ——.721 Ut..,—-— .380 (mt..I —-pt—i)
-~ ,p__ 5
1977 tAct.) 4.9% 7.0% 5.9% 11.0% 7.2%
1978 3.4 5.4 6.5 10.1 6.6
1979 2.9 5.4 6.5 9.6 6.1
1980 2.9 5.6 6.3 9.4 5.9
1981 2.0 5.7 6.] 8,2 4.7
1982 2.4 6.1 5.5 8.0 4.5
1983 2.8 6.0 5.0 8.0 4.5
1984 3.1 5.8 4.8 8.0 4.5
1985 3.2 5.7 4.7 8.0 4.5
N . ~ petS of in wi’. LU- en It-. c-i T,hlc’ I ar.d thet path ‘if p was
,-udc,tlac,-.i 1,.,,, , it:,; I i.: II - tine:, maul p. Ott’ U path
wa- tb,., e:-l:-nL,tol ‘-‘o, .‘q.a.ti’,iI cl - Thu ~ path f,i..t.
Ta tile: I CLIII the p -atIin-lu u, td t-, ra’r,l’.ti’ U r. inipi ed x,
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Compare these results with those im-
plied by the monetary model of infla-
lion and unemployment. Using the
growth rates of money derived for the
conventional model in Tables I and II,
the paths for inflation and unemploy-
ment for the monetary model are traced
out in Tables III and IV. According to
Table III, attempting a gradual return
to full employment can be accomplished,
but in the early stages there is an accel-
eration of inflation rather than the de-
celeration predicted by the conventional
model. In 1980, inflation decelerates in
response to the slowing in the growth
rate of money. However, unemployment
aLso rises again before the steady state
is finally approached in 1984 and 1985.
‘fo e’cplore in gi’eut r depth the iuphc-ations of the
niouet,try view. altel-Ilathe Sililllliiliufl, of stead’
gro~~ th rak-s of money are shown in Table \‘. in each
Table iV
HYPOTHETICAL CASE B: MONETARY VIEW
Attempted Rapid Return to Full Employment
Pt — Pt-i = .449 ~mt_I -—— pt—j)
~2j Ut -- Ut_i = 3,958 - .721 U:.j .380 tm Pt-i)
-~ U P
1977 tAct.~ 4,9% 7.0% 5.9% 11,0% 7.2%
1978 6.1 5.4 6,5 13.0 9.5
1979 1.0 4.3 7.8 8.9 5.4
1980 2.1 6.1 6.7 8.9 5.4
1981 2.6 6.1 6.1 8.9 5.4
1982 2.9 6.0 5.8 8.9 5.4
1983 3.1 5.8 5.6 8.9 5.4
1984 3.2 5.6 5.5 8.9 5.4
1985 3.2 5.6 5.5 8.9 5.4




ALTERNATIVE CASES: MONETARY VIEW
Rapid Return to Steady Money Growth
(1) pi — pt_i = .449 (mt_I -— pt-i)
(2) U~---— Ui_i = 3.958—- .721 Ut— -—.380 (ml 1 pt—i)
2% Money 4% Money 6°~ Money 8% Money
Growth Growth Growth Growth
p U p U p U p U
1977 (Act.) 5.9% 7.0% 5.9% 7.0% 5.9% 7.0% 5.9% 7.0%
1978 6.5 5.4 6.5 5.4 6.5 5.4 6 5 5.4
1979 4,5 7.2 5.4 6.4 5.9 5.7 7.2 4.9
1980 3.4 6.9 4.8 63 5.9 5.5 75 5.0
1981 28 6.4 4.4 6.0 5.9 5.5 7.7 5.2
1982 2.4 6.1 4.2 5.8 6.0 5.4 7.9 53
1983 2.2 5.8 4.1 5.6 6.0 55 7.9 5.4
1984 2,1 5.7 4.1 5.6 6.0 55 7.9 5.4
1985 2.1 5.6 4.0 5.6 6.0 5.5 7.9 5.4
Examination of the other case (Table IV) — an case, the steady-state rate of monetary growth is
attempted quick return to full employment — mdi- begun in 1978. According to these simulations, there
cates severe oscillations in inflation and unemploy- appears to be little prospect for reducing the inflation
ment before the steady state is approached. The un- rate from its 1977 value withont incurring a period of
employment target is overshot, and the rapid growth rising unemployment during the interim. Flowever,
in money in 1978 has its effect on the inflation rate for the policies of inflation control (2 and 4 percent
several years. money growth) show that once the period of rising
unemployment is weathered, both inflation and un-
employment decline from their 1977 values toward
their steady-state values.
Conclusions
The Administration has taken an approach to con-
trolling inflation that is predicated on the assump-
tion that economic slack is a factor in determining
the inflation rate. In particular, the direct approach
to inflation control has been chosen by the Adminis-
tration because the terms of the trade-off between
inflation and unemployment are deemed unacceptable,
Policy based on this type of reasoning is potentially
disruptive. According to the simple monetary model
used here, attempts to stimulate output with expan-
sionary monetary policywill have accompanyingeffects
on inflation, despite apparent slack in the economy.
Even though there is a similarity in long-nm targets,
substantially different paths to this equilibrium are
derived, depending on which model is used and how
fast the policymakers hope to achieve their targets.
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